Post-Quantum Software Licensing: Preserving Trust Across the Product Lifecycle
12.11.2026 Daniela Previtali
A machine sold today may still be earning its owner money when the cryptography protecting its software licenses needs to change. Its mechanics may be sound. Its software may still perform exactly as intended. Yet the mechanism that decides whether a feature is legitimately licensed may need a new foundation.
For manufacturers of software-defined products, that makes post-quantum cryptography (PQC) a question about the continuity of their business model. How will a device continue to recognize a valid authorization throughout its service life? And how can that trust be renewed without forcing customers to rebuild the systems they depend on?
The value behind a license
Consider a manufacturer that sells additional machine functions through software licenses. The commercial agreement establishes what the customer may use; the licensing system helps enforce that agreement. If the device cannot distinguish an authentic authorization from a forged one, the manufacturer’s ability to control access to those functions is weakened.
A sufficiently capable quantum computer could undermine widely used public-key methods such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. Where a licensing architecture relies on vulnerable digital signatures, this could enable forged authorizations. The precise consequences depend on how licenses are created, checked, and enforced; a quantum attack would not automatically bypass every protection in a product.
This adds an authenticity problem to the familiar concern about information being collected now for decryption later. A license need not contain a valuable secret to carry valuable authority. The relevant question is also whether a device will continue to trust the right issuer. NIST’s digital signature standard explains the role of signatures in detecting changes and authenticating signatories; applying that principle to software licensing makes the business exposure clear.
The migration clock is already running
No credible product plan needs an exact prediction of when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will arrive. It does need an assessment of how long a deployed product must remain trustworthy and how long changing its cryptography will take.
NIST’s first three PQC standards, finalized in August 2024, provide mechanisms for establishing shared keys and producing digital signatures designed to resist quantum attacks. Standards give implementers a foundation. They do not perform the integration, field validation, or coordination required across an installed base.
Policy is moving in the same direction. The EU’s coordinated PQC roadmap, published in June 2025, provides recommendations for coordinated national transitions. The European Commission’s September 2026 survey report records requests for clarification about milestones, prioritization, hybrid schemes, and implementation. These are practical planning questions, not evidence of a universal legal deadline for every device manufacturer.
For a product team, waiting has a tangible cost: another design may enter service with cryptographic dependencies that are difficult to change. Reviewing those dependencies while the architecture is still open can preserve options for both the manufacturer and its customers.
Map the decisions that depend on cryptography
A useful starting point is to follow one authorization through the product. Who issues it? How does it reach the device? Where is it stored? Which component verifies it before a function is enabled? Then identify the keys, algorithms, software, and hardware on which each decision depends.
This is our application of a broader migration principle: make cryptographic dependencies visible before deciding what to replace. NIST’s migration project combines discovery of cryptographic use with interoperability work. In secure licensing, the inventory should connect those technical dependencies to actual entitlements and operating conditions.
A remotely managed device and an intermittently connected machine may need different migration plans. An old license might remain valid for years, while a new feature entitlement arrives next month. Teams need to establish which combinations of old and new components must work together, for how long, and under whose responsibility.
Crypto agility has to survive contact with the installed base
Crypto agility is the ability to adapt cryptographic mechanisms while maintaining security and operation. NIST’s guidance on crypto agility treats this as a system-wide capability spanning software, hardware, protocols, and infrastructure. A choice of algorithms in a library is only part of the task.
For licensing, we suggest judging a migration by the protection it adds at each boundary. Updating a remote communication channel can be valuable while an existing hardware license container remains in use. But that step does not, by itself, extend post-quantum protection into the container or change every local verification operation.
Hybrid approaches combine established and post-quantum mechanisms. Their practical value depends on the construction and its implementation. Teams still need to test resource consumption, message handling, interoperability, and failure behavior on the devices they actually support.
There is a real trade-off here. Replacing hardware too early can impose avoidable costs; retaining it indefinitely can leave a protection boundary that software alone cannot move. A credible roadmap makes that trade-off explicit and defines the conditions for the next step.
Making the protection boundary visible at electronica
This is the question Wibu-Systems and Infineon are bringing to electronica 2026 with an interactive demonstrator built around CodeMeter, Wibu-Systems’ all-in-one software protection and licensing platform.
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Visitors can follow a license update along illuminated paths and compare three stages of migration. The starting point is today’s CodeMeter deployment.
The first migration stage adds a hybrid PQC layer between CodeMeter License Central, which creates, manages, and delivers licenses, and CodeMeter Runtime, the device software that manages license access. Existing CmDongles, hardware containers for licenses and cryptographic keys, remain in use. Their local exchange continues to use established cryptography.
The target architecture extends hybrid protection into future CmDongles using Infineon TEGRION™ SLM22. TEGRION is Infineon’s family of hardware security controllers for protecting sensitive data and cryptographic operations; it includes an EAL6+ certified PQC hardware security controller. The target requires coordinated changes in the licensing infrastructure, runtime, and dongle.
The electronica demonstration visualizes the roadmap through simulated data flows; it is not a claim that the complete target architecture is available today. It gives visitors a concrete way to discuss what can evolve through software and where new hardware fits. It will be shown November 10–13 in Munich at Infineon booth C3.502.
Make your next investment with future flexibility in mind
Manufacturers can begin with one representative product and its licensing chain. Record the cryptographic dependencies, the remaining service life, and the components that can be updated. Assign responsibility for each transition, including the supplier dependencies and maintenance windows that could delay it.
Then test the proposed migration against real operating conditions. Verify that valid entitlements survive the transition, altered authorizations are rejected, and unsupported combinations fail in a controlled way. Include interrupted updates, disconnected operation where relevant, and attempts to force the system back to weaker protection. Protecting the update mechanism itself belongs in that work.
The resulting plan should show what remains protected at every stage and what evidence is needed before moving forward. That is a useful basis for investment decisions today: can the product preserve its legitimate authorizations and renew the trust behind them for as long as customers need it?
Discuss your migration path with Infineon and Wibu-Systems experts at electronica, and explore what the next steps mean for your devices and licensing architecture.
Contributor
Daniela Previtali
Global Marketing Director
Daniela is a marketing veteran who has dedicated more than twenty-five years of her career to the service of world-leading IT security vendors. Throughout her journey in this field, she has covered executive positions in international sales, product marketing, and product management and acquired comprehensive knowledge of both digital rights management solutions and authentication technologies. Working from the German headquarters of Wibu-Systems, she is currently leading both corporate and channel marketing activities, innovating penetration strategies, and infusing her multinational team with a holistic mindset.